



After our court's initial review of the case, there is no longer a question as to whether Morgan sustained the injury she claimed in her second filing. Instead, the sole question on appeal is whether her carpal-tunnel injury is compensable under Arkansas's workers' compensation laws.

Our appellate charge is to review the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings. *Geo Speciality Chem. Inc. v. Clingan*, 69 Ark. App. 369, 372, 13 S.W.3d 218, 219 (2000). Further, we must affirm the decision of the Commission if its findings are supported by substantial evidence. *Id.* We cannot rehear the case. In fact, "[e]ven where a preponderance of the evidence might indicate a contrary result, we affirm if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion." *Huffy Serv. First v. Ledbetter*, 76 Ark. App. 533, 541, 69 S.W.3d 449, 455 (2002). And as we have here, where the Commission denied benefits because the claimant failed to meet her burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires that we affirm if the Commission's decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. *Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc.*, 341 Ark. 804, 809, 20 S.W.3d 900, 903 (2000).

After a careful review of the record in this case, we are satisfied that substantial evidence supports the Commission's conclusion that Morgan failed to prove that her carpal-tunnel diagnosis is linked to her work with Deluxe Video. Under our state's law, she bears the burden of proving that her injury stemmed from her work at Deluxe Video and not from any other source. *Arnold v. Tyson Foods, Inc.*, 64 Ark. App. 245, 983 S.W.2d 444 (1998). This burden was a difficult one for Morgan to carry, particularly in light of her own doctor's statement that her carpal tunnel could have spontaneously occurred. Morgan did testify at

length about her employment with Deluxe Video, and the worsening problems with her hands. Unfortunately, this linking testimony was exclusively provided by Morgan, which the Commission was free to disbelieve, discount, or disregard entirely. *Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker*, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999). And, the medical evidence compiled during Morgan's employment with Deluxe Video did not corroborate her testimony. Indeed, the Commission concluded "there were no medical reports or other documentary evidence corroborating [Morgan's] testimony that she had been suffering from gradual symptoms in both hands" while employed with Deluxe Video.

Further, she was diagnosed five months after her employment with Deluxe Video had ended. Her own physician, Dr. Marcia Hixson, remarked, "the bilateral carpal tunnel symptoms that [Morgan] is having is not related to [Morgan's ganglion cyst] injury of 4-14-02 and is probably not related to the employment at Delux (sic) Video."

While we are sympathetic to Morgan's suffering, we cannot overlook the fact she did not carry her burden in establishing the requisite nexus between her injury and her employment with Deluxe Video. As such, we affirm the Commission's denial of benefits.

Affirmed.

GLADWIN and HUNT, JJ., agree.